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The habit construct, and proxy measures of habit such as frequency and recency 
measures of past behaviour (Bagozzi & Warshaw, 1990), has been a topic of considerable 
interest to health psychology theorists and researchers interested in the factors related to 
health behaviour (Ajzen, 2002; Chatzisarantis, Hagger, & Smith, 2007; Hagger, Anderson, 
Kyriakaki, & Darkings, 2007; Hagger, Chatzisarantis, & Biddle, 2001; Hagger, 
Chatzisarantis, & Harris, 2006; Norman & Conner, 2006; Norman, Conner, & Bell, 2000; 
Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Verplanken & Faes, 1999). Gardner (2014) recently reviewed the 
literature on the effects of the habit construct in health-related research. In the review, habit 
was defined as a “as a process by which a stimulus automatically generates an impulse 
towards action, based on learned stimulus-response associations” (p. 4). Gardner’s review 
represents a step forward in understanding the various definitions of habit in the social 
psychological literature applied to health, and provides considerable insight into the 
definitions of habit, types of habitual behaviour, effectiveness of previous models and tests of 
habit in the health-related literature, the limitations of habit research, avenues for future 
research, and implications for interventions. 
One topic on which Gardner focuses is the various means by which habit has been 
measured in previous research. He indicates that self-report habit indexes, in which 
individuals reflect on the automaticity of action through their previous experience, represent 
the typical means to measure habit (Gardner, Abraham, Lally, & de Bruijn, 2012; Verplanken 
& Orbell, 2003). Gardner touches upon some of the limitations of such measures, indicating 
that the measures neglect cues (Sniehotta & Presseau, 2012) and that some of the items likely 
invite responses consistent with frequency of action rather than automaticity (Gardner & 
Tang, 2014). In this commentary, we aim to contribute to, and extend, Gardner’s points on 
the limitations of habit measures. We contend that such measures do not solely capture 
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problematic in that individuals are unlikely to have access or awareness of the cues and 
associated responses that give rise to habitual action. Reliance on such indexes may lead to 
erroneous inferences in the extent to which behaviours are controlled by habitual processes. 
We illustrate our points with examples from the health behaviour context. 
We wholly endorse Gardner’s definition of habitually-initiated behaviour through his 
synthesis of research and theory on habit. We also agree that habitually-initiated behaviour 
should be distinct from habitually-performed behaviours. Gardner makes it clear that a 
distinction needs to be made between learned cue-induced triggers to action, which may be 
habitual, and the subsequent chain of actions and behavioural responses that require 
considerable planning and deliberative processing (c.f. Hagger, 2013, in press; Hagger & 
Chatzisarantis, 2014; Hagger & Luszczynska, 2014; Hofmann, Friese, & Wiers, 2011; 
Sheeran, Gollwitzer, & Bargh, 2013; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Events in the environment 
may trigger thoughts of an intended behaviour that are activated automatically, but the 
processes that lead to enacting that behaviour require considerable planning and, possibly, 
flexibility of thought. For example, a smoker may have strong social cues to smoke after 
eating a meal at a restaurant, but if she is in a non-smoking venue or has run out of cigarettes, 
she will have to plan to discover the best place to smoke or locate a vendor for cigarettes. Of 
course, some of the actions along the way of enactment may be habitually-performed, such as 
the decision itself of the need to buy cigarettes, but we suspect that very few of the actions 
that constitute behaviour in this example are truly habitual. Health behaviours are, on the 
whole, extremely complex, as acknowledged by Gardner and colleagues (2014; Gardner, de 
Bruijn, & Lally, 2012; Lally & Gardner, 2013) and others (Lally, van Jaarsveld, Potts, & 
Wardle, 2010; Maddux, 1997), such that the possibility of these behaviours being largely, or 
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Individuals are, therefore, likely to be aware of many or all of the processes and 
experiences of engaging in a health-related behaviour. As Gardner (2014) contends: “The 
notion that everyday health behaviours may be wholly rigidly automated and performed with 
little control, awareness or intention does not match the subjective experience of most health 
behaviours” (p. 5). Habitual action is likely to have a substantive conscious component or be 
subject to conscious experience of the action by the individual. We contend that this creates a 
problem for self-report habit indexes, for conceptual and empirical reasons. Conceptually, 
individuals may not have access to the ‘higher-order’ cognitive processes that guide 
automatic or habitual behaviours. This has been documented in the literature on numerous 
occasions (Newell & Shanks, 2014; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). For example, Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977), in their seminal review of introspective accounts and higher-order cognitive 
processes, indicate that individuals are unlikely to have access to the perceptual and memory-
based processes that lead to many responses that occur at the implicit level. They review 
evidence that individuals are often unable to (a) identify key stimuli or cues that lead to 
responses, (b) identify whether or not a response to the cue has occurred, or (c) make any 
inferential link between a response and the critical cue. Habitual actions, by definition, are 
likely to share many of the components of the higher-order cognitive processes to which 
Nisbett and Wilson refer. This presents a problem for any self-report measure that purports to 
tap into processes likely to be of limited or no access to the respondent. Empirically, this also 
presents a problem for the validation of self-report measures of habit – what are they actually 
measuring? Given that the processes leading to habitual action are possibility ‘out of reach’ 
of the individual, the likelihood is that these indexes merely tap the experience of habit rather 
than actual habitual processes that lead to the action.  
The likely lack of access by individuals to the executive processes that lead to habitual 











































RUNNING HEAD: Self-Reports of Habit  6 
 
the mechanisms that control action. Although individuals may be aware of their actions and 
subjectively feel that the action is controlled by automatic, non-conscious processes, it does 
not mean the action will actually be controlled by these processes. Furthermore, some of the 
apparently habitual actions that constitute health behaviour may be blended with other non-
habitual automatic processes (e.g., motivational, evaluative, or cognitive biases; Bargh & 
Ferguson, 2000; Rothman, Sheeran, & Wood, 2009). People may not, therefore, be able to 
distinguish between actions that are habitual and automatic, deliberative and conscious, or 
non-habitual and automatic. This will likely lead to confusion or inaccuracies by respondents 
over the attribution of their actions to habit. 
Adopting a definition of habit as a behavioural response in a learned cue-response 
pairing, then, by definition, individuals would not have ‘access’ to the process that triggers a 
habitual behavioural response, as Nisbett and Wilson (1977) contend. As Gardner 
acknowledges, individuals may only be aware of the consequences of behavioural actions, 
and have access these consequences rather than the cue-induced initiation of the action at the 
time it was performed, which occurred without conscious awareness. For example, Gardner 
suggests that a smoker may be unaware of lighting up a cigarette but knows that they must 
have done so because the cigarette is alight (e.g., “I cannot recall lighting my cigarette, yet it 
is lit, so I must have lit it automatically”; Gardner, de Bruijn, et al., 2012; Sniehotta & 
Presseau, 2012). However, we contend, that not being able to recall initiating an action or 
performing the action, does not, in itself, mean that the action was habitual. Memory research 
indicates that actions performed regularly become abstracted and normalised such that access 
to specific events and, therefore, recollection of those events, may be difficult (Repovs & 
Baddeley, 2006). This is supported by evidence from the habit literature. Hyde et al. (2012) 
demonstrated that people with ‘stronger’ physical activity habits (higher scores on the 
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people with weaker habits. However, that does not mean that the action was performed, at 
any stage, from initiation through performance to completion, through non-conscious or 
habitual processes. In other words, people’s recollection as to whether a behaviour was 
initiated or performed automatically may be inherently unreliable as a measure of habit. To 
further illustrate this point, Gardner and Tang (2014) recently found that participants are 
likely to encounter a considerable number of difficulties recalling actions, cues to action, and 
the extent to which they are ‘automated’ when completing self-reported habit indexes. 
Individuals may believe that a behaviour is habit driven and an action that they believe 
they do without conscious awareness or cognitive input, but that subjective experience may 
be inaccurate. Individuals may falsely attribute an action they do regularly to be ‘habit’, 
when, in reality, the behavioural response requires considerable cognitive effort and 
deliberative planning even if the initiation of the action itself may be a learned response to a 
cue or some event in their environment. Similarly, individuals may engage in behaviours that 
are a direct response to a cue or action but they may consider it an action over which they 
believe they have considerable control. If behaviours are initiated by automatic processes, the 
hallmark of habits, then there would be an expectation that people would have little access to 
the processes that led to their initiation or enactment, and, they may very well make 
erroneous judgements on self-report instruments that ask them to self-report the extent to 
which their behaviour is automatized (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
The ready availability of measures that ostensibly tap ‘automatic’ or ‘implicit’ biases 
may provide opportunity to provide evidence for the concurrent validity of self-report habit 
indices (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007). Correlating self-report habit indexes for health 
behaviours of interest with measures of implicit processes may provide some corroboration 
for the indexes. Confirming concurrent validity may be a boon to social scientists looking for 
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of decision tasks is impractical. Could a self-reported habit index with respect to a particular 
behaviour, such as diet or alcohol consumption, correlate with a decision task that ostensibly 
taps automatic bias toward the same behaviour, such as a go-no go task for food preference 
(e.g., Veling, Aarts, & Stroebe, 2013) or implicit association test for alcohol identity (e.g., 
Caudwell & Hagger, in press), respectively? Supposing such tests provide the requisite 
corroborating evidence with, for example, medium-to-large effect sizes, would that evidence 
alone provide definitive confirmatory support that such indexes tap the precise automatic 
processes involved in habitual action? The correlations may give an indication that self-
assessment of habits share substantive variance with implicit biases with the key caveat 
relating to accessibility of automated, implicit processes (Nisbett & Wil on, 1977). But 
correlating the two measures alone may not lead to an entirely satisfactory resolution given 
the validity of the tests against which the self-reported habit index may be compared has also 
been hotly debated (e.g., Blanton et al., 2009; Fiedler, Messner, & Bluemke, 2006; Friese, 
Hofmann, & Schmitt, 2009). 
It is also important to note that there may also be other ‘automatic’ processes that drive 
behaviour that may be attributed to habits, because people report that they experience them as 
‘automated’, but may not be habitual at all. As self-report habit indexes focus on habit and 
associated automated processes there is the underlying assumption that all behaviours 
experienced as automatic are habitual and not due to other automatic processes that are 
independent of learned cue-response pairings. Research has shown that individuals may 
evaluate and, consequently, have automatic biases toward stimuli with which they are 
unfamiliar and to which they have had no previous exposure or stored information. Such 
biases could not have been developed through experience or the result of previously learned 
responses to cues presented in the environment. In other words, some automatic responses are 
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showed that people have automatic biases toward novel stimuli to which they had no previous 
experience or exposure. In terms of health behaviour, such novel stimuli may be manifested 
in health-compromising behaviours to which an individual has not previously been exposed, 
such as eating a novel food or experiencing a novel substance (e.g., trying an illegal drug). 
Self-reported habit indexes, therefore, may not account for different types of automatic 
processes that may affect health behaviour. 
In conclusion, the problem facing much of research in the health behaviour literature on 
habits is that it relies on self-report indexes that characterize habit as a subjective experience 
of automaticity. This is at loggerheads with Gardner’s (2014) and others’ definitions of habit 
as actions that are well-learned behaviours that are initiated, or performed, without any 
conscious awareness (c.f., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). This inconsistency, coupled with the fact 
that people tend to forget, or have difficulty recalling, the circumstances that lead to their 
behaviour, means that habit indexes likely capture more than just habitual action. Measures 
that capture the implicit, automatized links between health-related stimuli and concomitant 
learned responses such as implicit association tests may offer potential solutions to habit 
measurement (Keatley, Clarke, & Hagger, 2012, 2013). However, researchers considering 
association measures must be aware that their use comes with the important caveats that they 
may lack applicability and ecological validity in health research (Gardner, 2014) and have 
been criticized for their lack of external validity (Blanton, Jaccard, Christie, & Gonzales, 
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